Medicare Beneficiaries Covered By Medicaid Buy-In Agreements
Nearly five million Medicare beneficiaries also receive Medicaid assistance. Who should take charge of their coverage, states or the federal government?
by Katie Merrell, David C. Colby, and Christopher Hogan ABSTRACT: About 13 percent of Medicare beneficiaries receive some assistance from Medicaid. States "buy in" Medicare coverage for these low-income beneficiaries. For those eligible, states also provide benefits beyond those covered by Medicare. Buy-in beneficiaries are different from other Medicare beneficiaries in many ways. They have lower incomes, which is consistent with the policy intent. They use more health services in general but do not appear to receive timely, appropriate care relative to several disease-specific standards. As policymakers consider restructuring Medicare and Medicaid, careful attention needs to be paid to the effects of changes on these beneficiaries. N e a r l y f i v e m i l l i o n M e d i ca r e beneficiaries (13 percent) received some assistance from Medicaid at some point during 1993. States use Medicaid funds to "buy in" Medicare coverage for these low-income beneficiaries by paying Medicare premiums, deductibles, and copayments. 1 For those eligible, states also provide broader benefits under Medicaid that exceed the scope of Medicare coverage. Although different categories of beneficiaries receive different types of assistance, Medicaid plays a crucial role in providing health care coverage for these Medicare beneficiaries. Even though beneficiaries covered by buy-in agreements may have health care needs and present challenges that are different from the broader Medicare and Medicaid populations, they typically are not considered separately when policy changes are considered.
This DataWatch first briefly reviews the policies that affect these buy-in beneficiaries and then compares them with the general Medicare population with regard to demographic characteristics, use of health services, reported health status, and access to care. The basic information presented should help to inform ongoing policy debates on restructuring Medicare and Medicaid and provide some baseline data against which to compare future analyses of these beneficiaries' health status and use of health services.
Buy-In Arrangements
State Medicaid programs serve Medicare beneficiaries in two distinct ways. First, they pay Medicare premiums and cost-sharing expenses for certain types of beneficiaries. Second, they may provide additional benefits to Medicare beneficiaries who also qualify for their state's Medicaid program. In either case, Medicare is the primary insurer for these beneficiaries.
The proportion of the Medicare population that is covered by Medicaid buy-in provisions varies by state. Although fewer than 7 percent of beneficiaries are covered by such provisions in eight states, two states cover more than 20 percent of Medicare beneficiaries with Medicaid buy-in arrangements. These differences reflect different states' policies as well as variation in the composition of states' populations.
Beneficiaries who qualify for Medicaid. The largest group of Medicare beneficiaries covered by Medicaid buy-in agreements consists of those who also qualify for Medicaid. Such dual eligibility may result from a person's being medically or categorically needy. Categorical eligibility for Medicaid is based on eligibility for income assistance programs, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Eligibility for Medicaid also may be extended to the medically needy, those persons whose incomes or resources exceed standards for cash assistance but who meet a separate state-determined income standard and also are aged. Persons who "spend down" income and assets on large health care expenses may qualify as medically needy. Categorically needy and medically needy beneficiaries receive benefits beyond those covered by Medicare, including coverage of prescription drugs and nursing home care. They also receive assistance in paying their Medicare premiums and cost sharing.
Beneficiaries who qualify for cost-sharing and premium assistance. Certain Medicare beneficiaries may be eligible for Medicaid coverage of Medicare premiums and cost sharing even if they do not otherwise qualify for Medicaid assistance. These beneficiaries receive such assistance because of concerns that they would otherwise be unable to meet Medicare's financial requirements.
Federal law defines two low-income groups-qualified Medicare beneficiaries (QMBs) and specified low-income Medicare beneficiaries (SLMBs)-who may receive such assistance. 2 QMBs, whose incomes are below the poverty level and whose assets do not exceed 200 percent of those allowed under the SSI program, receive state assistance with both Part B premiums and cost sharing. SLMBs, who have incomes up to 120 percent of the poverty level and must meet the same resource standards as those set for QMBs, receive only Part B premium support.
Comparison Of Beneficiaries
Information from both the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) and Medicare claims files allows for comparison of Medicare beneficiaries in Medicaid buy-in groups with the general Medicare population. 3 In the following description, beneficiaries are designated as being covered by Medicaid if they were included in a buy-in arrangement at any point during the year, according to administrative records. Because the nonelderly constitute a disproportionately large share of buy-in beneficiaries and are likely to have different health status and needs, the two groups are analyzed both separately and in combination. Unfortunately, available data do not permit separate analyses of groups based on their reason for buy-in eligibility.
Demographics. Medicare beneficiaries under age sixty-five are disproportionately represented in the Medicaid buy-in group (Exhibit 1). These younger beneficiaries, who are eligible for Medicare through disability or the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) program, account for almost a third of the Medicaid buy-in group but only 10 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare beneficiaries in the Medicaid group are more likely to be women, be nonwhite, reside in nursing homes, and have annual incomes below $10,000 (Exhibit 2). Some of these characteristics reflect the intent of Medicaid policy decisions. The higher proportion of beneficiaries residing in nursing homes is a result of the spend-down provisions, while lower incomes result from the eligibility tie to income support programs. A similar pattern by buy-in status and age is reported for instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) limitations, although the difference by age is somewhat larger for this more socially oriented measure. There is a much larger difference by Medicaid status in the proportion of respondents who report no disabilities for the group over age sixty-five than there is for the younger group, for whom the difference is not significant. Use of services. The Medicaid group is somewhat more likely to have had an inpatient stay during the year and three times more likely to have been in a skilled nursing facility (SNF) (Exhibit 4). 4 Although the differences in hospitalization rates across Medicaid status are fairly similar for both age groups, those for SNFs are much different. Among younger beneficiaries there is a slight and insignificant correlation between Medicaid status and likelihood of having an SNF stay, while there is a significant fourfold difference for those over age sixty-five. Medicare payments, both Part A and Part B, were about 70 percent higher for the Medicaid buy-in group than for the non-Medicaid group.
Access to care. This DataWatch uses two different approaches to analyzing access to care. The first approach uses beneficiaries' responses to surveys about whether they are satisfied with their Beneficiaries' reports of access. Beneficiaries' reports of access vary by buy-in status and age. Older beneficiaries and those without Medicaid report being more satisfied with service availability (Exhibit 5). The Medicaid group also is about one-third less likely to report being very satisfied with the quality of care they receive, with smaller differences across the age groups.
Medicare beneficiaries under age sixty-five are much more likely to report delaying care because of costs, regardless of buy-in status, although those with Medicaid did so at about two-thirds the rate of their non-Medicaid peers. Medicaid status does not strongly differentiate elderly beneficiaries with regard to delaying care for cost reasons; both groups report doing so about half as often as the younger Medicaid group.
Monitoring access using clinically based measures. RAND, under contract to the Physician Payment Review Commission (PPRC), has developed a set of clinical indicators of access that are appropriate for monitoring access among Medicare beneficiaries. These clinically based utilization and outcomes measures have been estimated for Medicare beneficiaries by buy-in status, based on claims from 1992 and 1993 for a 1 percent sample of beneficiaries. 5 The estimates 
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are adjusted for age and sex. Of the fourteen indicators reported here, there are statistically significant differences between the Medicaid and non-Medicaid groups for all but three (Exhibit 6). For the most part, these differences suggest that the Medicare beneficiaries covered by buy-in agreements were much less likely to receive specific types of preventive care, follow-up care, or testing. 6 For example, although only 40 percent of women in the non-Medicaid group received a mammogram every two years, barely more than one-quarter of women in the Medicaid group did so. Similarly, the Medicaid group was more likely to exhibit patterns of care thought to be related to inadequate disease management, such as three or more emergency department visits within a year for cardiovascular-related diagnoses.
The Medicaid group had higher rates for chest x-ray after initial diagnosis of breast cancer. The ten-percentage-point difference between the two groups is similar to the difference in the rates at which mammograms were received at diagnosis, although in the opposite direction. Also, the Medicaid group was slightly more likely to receive expected blood tests after a diagnosis of anemia.
Discussion
The current debate about restructuring both Medicare and Medicaid could affect the way in which the two programs relate to each other and the coverage that they now provide to the beneficiaries described here. Recent proposals call for changing Medicaid into a block-grant program and for broadening patient choice within the Medicare program. The block-grant approach to Medicaid would replace federal coverage and benefit package requirements with fixed grants to states and few federal rules. Medicare would be restructured so that beneficiaries could choose traditional Medicare coverage or from an array of managed care plans, private fee-forservice plans, and medical savings accounts. Each of these options would provide at least the same coverage as traditional Medicare provides, although cost sharing would likely differ across the various options.
One policy outcome of the block-grant approach seems likely. States' responses will be different. Some states have been innovators, while others have maintained traditional policies and programs. 7 Prior to enactment of the Social Security Act, with its public assistance provisions, twenty-two states did not have public assistance programs for the elderly, and those that did had a wide range of state and county residency requirements, income limits, and benefit amounts. 8 Thirty years after the passage of the Social Security Act, variation in state public assistance programs had dimin- ished but not disappeared. 9 Further evidence of the likelihood of variation is provided by QMBs, who were covered by only three states prior to the mandated coverage in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988.
Although it is difficult to predict the impact of various state responses on the health care of those Medicare beneficiaries discussed here, two related concerns emerge. First, if a state decreases or eliminates its financial support for premiums and cost sharing, access for these beneficiaries may be threatened. Second, this population may not have an adequate choice of options under a restructured Medicare program. These concerns are based on the analysis above coupled with previous research that suggests that poorer, sicker persons are particularly vulnerable to changes in access and health status in the face of such policy changes.
If some states do not pay for premiums and cost sharing for some of the Medicare beneficiaries whose incomes are below the poverty line, access to care would be diminished. The RAND Health Insurance Experiment provides some evidence that cost-sharing requirements worsen some health outcomes for persons in low-income groups. Although for most persons free health care did not improve health outcomes, it improved the health outcomes of poor persons with certain health conditions and elevated risk, such as hypertension. 10 Additionally, in response to cost sharing, low-income groups reduced both appropriate and inappropriate care.
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State policy responses to block grants also could threaten the degree of choice of health plans available to buy-in beneficiaries. The promise of Medicare choice may not be fulfilled if the poor cannot choose among competing plans because they have little or no disposable income available for differences in premiums or costsharing requirements. 12 There has been little consideration of what impact policies that would restructure Medicare and Medicaid would have on those served by both programs. If the programs are restructured, the policy challenge is to ensure continued access for those beneficiaries described in this DataWatch. The results also suggest that buy-in beneficiaries are at risk for diminished access to appropriate, timely care compared with other beneficiaries, even under current policies.
